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THE NEED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
CLASS ACTION SUITS

•

The National Academy of Sciences recently pnblished
a book entitled Resources aud Mau' which dramatically
forecast the geometric increase in competition for resources, space, recreation, transportation, housing, and
public and private facilities of all kinds. It was critical
of the lack of resource planning for the future and
strongly recommended new institutions and policies to
help insure wise resource use and improved resource
policies. Other scholars have stressed the necessity for
new legal tools in assessing technology, which is today
causing a millenium of change every few years.
There is growing concern for whether or not our legal
problem-solving machinery has the ability to adequately
protect mankind from the dangers of the present and
to plan for the future. One necessary legal tool which
can be effectively explored is the citizen class action
law suit.
New proposals have been introduced in Congress allowing consumer class action lawsnits' ami citizen lawsuits
for environmental protection.' The justification for these
1 National Academy of Sciences, R~'Ou.Tce8 and Man (1969) .
• S. 1980, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) •
• S. 3575, 9lat Cong., 2d Sos•• (1970).

59

,

GO

MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE

proposals is that new systmns are needed to act as checks
and balances and to insure a proper weighing of the "public interest." This justification has been the basis for the
increasing tendency of the federal courts to allow members of the puhlic to challenge the actions of the federal
administrative agencics.·
There is a definite trend, both in Congress and in the
Courts, to broaden the decision-making process of administrative government. Experience has shown that
administrative agencies do not always adequately protect the public interest. Then Judge, now Chief Justice,
Burger stated in Office of COllummicatiolts of Ultited
Church of Christ v. F.C.C.:'
The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the listener interests in a renewal
proceeding withont the aid and participation of
legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role
of private attorneys general is one of those assmnptions we collectively try to work with so long as they
are reasonably adequate. 'Vhen it hecomes clear,
as it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid
assumption which stands up under the realities of
actual experience, neither we nor the Commission
4 See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F,P,C' I 364
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1966), c.rt. lumied 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Office of
Communications of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C .• 369 F.2d 994
(C.A.D.C. 1966); Crowther v. Seaborg. 312 F. Supp. 1206 (D. Colo.
1970).
5359 F.2d 994. 1003 (C.A.D.C. 1966).
Public agencies aJso have their inadequacies; they also need
their system of checks and balances. Some are given inconsistent
functions like the A.E.C., which must both police and promote
the peaceful use of the atom. Some become captive of the in·
dustry they are supposed to regulate, some RTe lazy, some are
ignorant, some are victims of Parkinson's law. Their interest are
not always synomous with the public interest.
Testimony of Richard D. Lamm on S. 3575, gIst Cong., ld Seas.
(before Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Resources and Environment) (May 14, 1970).
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can continue to rely on it. The gradual expansion
and evolution of concepts of ~tand i ng in aclministrative law attests that e'.-p erience rather than logic
or fixed rules has been accepted as the guide.

•

Citizen lawsuits are increasingly being proposed to act
as an independent mechanism to supplement agency
action, to monitor and check agency aUlI executive action,
to spotlight needed areas of legislation and to insure
the inclusion of and the adequate weighing of all relevant
factors.
The environmental class action suit is an important
citizen action mechanism. It allows the "small stake
holder in a large controversy" to come to court and lay
more than his individual interest before the court. It
allows him to propose to the court that more than his
individual rights are at stake; that class or public rights
are to be weighed.
The class action is a procedural mechanism which,
while it does not create substantive rights in class
members,' does have considerahle value as a strategic
device far beyond its ostensiblc purpose to reduce a
"multiplicity of litigatiou.'"
One court perhaps more accurately described the
class action as "a way of redressing group wrongs ... ,
a semi-public remedy administered by the lawyer in
private practice-a cross between administrative action
and private action."· Its increasing use in litigation of
all types, and its recent well-publicized use in a number
of environmental and resource controversies, dictate a
close examination of its component parts.
Class actions are a particularly useful procedural tool
6 Pacific Inter.CJub Yacht Ass'n. v. Morris, 197 F. Supp. 218
(N.D. Calif. 1960), appeal dism'd 288 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1961).
1 See Dolgow v. Anderaon, 43 F.R-D. 472, 481, 484-486 (E.n.N.Y.
1968).
BId. at 481.

,
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in seeking group redress in important but limited
situations, but are not a cornucopia of remedies for all
societal ills; they are not devices for the strike-suit, the
champertous of the self-promoting litigator. ~'he patent
mmesses of some of the "class actions" recently filed show
that the limitations and dangers of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are not widely understood.

,

DEFINITION OF THE CLASS

The initial issue in any class action litigation is the
definition of the class. The parameters of the size of the
class are defined neither by rule nor by case law. On the
lower limit, a class which contained twenty-five individuals has been upheld.' On the upper parameter, there is
language that the size of a class is not an inherent objection to maintenance of a class action.'o Neither is the
maintenance of a class action precluded by the failure
to state the exact number of members of the class nor to
individually identify every member of the class,l1 if the
class is "defined with some precision. "11
Examination of some of the recent pleadings in
actions purporting to be class actions indicates the need
for properly defined classes. In a suit seeking damages
for harm to the environment allegedly caused by D.D.T.
and for reparations to restore the quality of the environ9 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452
(E.D. Pa. 1968); but see Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
10 EiBen v. Carlisle" Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). In
EUfm, the court stated no objection to a clus numbering 3,760,000.
11 Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v.
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11 Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Lopez
Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1969), is an example of
a class that was so vaguely defined that the court found that it would
be an uimpo88ible task" to apply the definition of the class to determine which persons were actually members of the claaa.

..
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ment allegedly degraded by D.D.T.," the class which
the plaintiff is allegedly representing is "all the people
of the United Statcs, not only of this generation, but
of those generations, yet unborn, ... who are entitled
to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the environment
and natural resources of the several States and the
United States without damage and degradation from
the production, distribution and use ... " of D.D.T. The
plaintiff in this action is also seeking to represent municipal taxpayers, allegedly the equitable owners of
natural resources held in trust for them by their municipal governments, and seeking damages to restore these
natural resources damaged by D.D.T. This action also
is on behalf of, and asserting the rights of, "all the people
of the United States, not only of this generation but of
those generations yet unborn, ... to freedom from the
involuntary accumulation of D.D.T. and its metabolites
within the lipid tissues of their bodies."
Cases challenging air pollution hy industry are similarly seeking to represent a class composed of a large
numher of individuals. In a suit to recover damages
and to enjoin sulfur dioxide pollution by the American
Smelting and Refining Company in EI Paso, Texas,14
the plaintiffs seek to represent citizens and residents
of Texas, New Mexico, and Mexico, who have suffered
injury, damages, annoyance, and inconvenience from
the alleged pollution of the air by the defendants, and
those who have shown "a special interest" in protecting
the public, their property, and the environment f rom
damage by air pollution. In an amended complaint,1S
II Yannacone v. Montrose Chern. Co., No. 3761~9 (S.D.N.Y., IIled
OcL 14. 1969), Individual damages f or each member ot this class
is not explicitly requested by the pleadings, however.
14 Fischer v. American Smelting & Refining Co., No. 70-CIU-729
(S.D.N.Y., IIled Feb. 24, 1970).
IS 70.ClU.729 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 19, 1970).

,
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new plaintiffs were added, suing on behalf of all those
people, both of this generation and of the generations
yet unborn, entitled to the protection of their healtlI
and welfare and to the protection of their environment
from damage from the failure of the defendant to install
"state-of-the-art" pollution control equipment.
An examination of the requirements of Rule 23 shows
the patent excesses of tlIese defined classes. Rule 23
first requires, in order to maintain a class action, that
"tlIe class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. . . . "" This requirement refers not to
"impossibility of joinder but only to the difficulty or
inconvenience of joinder of tlIe entire class."17 No one
would argue that tlIe classes defined in the previously
discussed environmental class actions meet tlIis requirement.
The next Rule 23 requirement, tlIat "there must be
questions of law and fact common to the class ... ,"
has been reiterated by a number of courts without giving
real help as to what are questions of law or fact common
to the class.18 A statement by another court, however,
provides support to which tlIe presumptuous pleader
,. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1).
17 Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909,
913-914 (9th Cir. 1964) .
•• Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 1952)
U[T]here must be some community of interest"j Knowles v. War
Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15,17 (C.A.D.C. 1949), ccrt. denied 336 U.S.
914 (1949): U[AJ common and undivided interest in the subject matter
of the cause of action"; Coke v. Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579, 583 (N.D.
Ga. 1960): "identity of interest"; Weisman v. M.e.A., Inc., 45 F.R.D.
258, 262 (D. Del. 1968): "Where • • • the question common to all
members of the class clearly predominate."
This requirement is similar to the additional requirement of Rule
23 (b) (3) and the courts often "determine the (a) (2) prerequisite of
a common question by questioning the predominance of common
issues." Note, "Class Actions Under Amended Rule 23: Three Years
of Judicial Interpretation," 49 B.U.L. Rev. 682, 695 (1969).

,
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can point to justify inclusion in his class of "all the
people in the United States":
The common issues need not be dispositive of the
entire litigation. The fact that questions peculiar to
each individual member of the class may remain
after the common questions have been resolved does
not dictate the conclusion that a class action is not
pennissible.'·
The requirements of Rules 23(a)(1) and 23(a)(2)
are, however, not the only requirements for definition
of a class under Rule 23}a In addition, the requirements
of either Rule 23(b)(1)(A), 23(h)(1)(B), 23(b)(2), or
23(b) (3) must be satisfied.
Environmental class actions seeking damages, as in
the illustrative purported class actions previously men·
tioned, will usually faIl under Rule 23(b)(3)}1 Environ·
mental class actions seeking damages will not fall under
Rule 23(b)(1) (A), since the threat of incompatible
standards can arise only in situations where equitable
relief is sought, as in class actions involving the rights
and duties of riparian owners, or of the rights and
duties of a land owner with respect to a nuisance.2l In
19 Dolgow, N. 7 supra at 490.
20 Advisory Committee's Note of 1966 to Revised Rule 23, 39
F.R.D. 100 (1966).
l' Class ... lions under Rule 23(b) (3) are regarded as "not aa
clearly called for" as under Rule. 23(b) (1) and 23(h) (2). Advisory
Committee's note supra, 39 F .R.D. at 102. Actions have not been
classified as Rule 23(b) (3) clus actions if they meet the requirements of Rule 23(b) (1) or 23(b) (2). Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 259
F. Supp. 125, 13~131 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Berman v. Narragansett
Raeing A..'n, (8 F.R.D. 333, 337 (D.R.I. 1969). Tbis haa been done
on the grounds that if the action is classified as a 23(b) (3) action,
members of the class may elect not to be included within the class
and would not be bound by the judgment. Van Gemert, supru at 130.
This would result in separate litigation by individual members of the
dus, placing an undue burden on the judiciary. and would contravene
the stated purpooes of Rule. 23(b) (l)(A) and 23 (b)(l) (b).
2l See Note, N. 20 ...pra at 100.

,
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environmental actions that seek damages, as in the
El Paso case, adjudications with respect to the claims
for damages by individuol members of the class would
not dispose of nor substantiolly impair the interests of
the other members of the class, so that they would not
come within the sphere of Rule 23(b)(1)(b).n Claims
for damages for injury to health or welfare from air
pollution, pesticides or radiation would involve individual, separate, and distinct claims; a resolution of
one such claim would not, except for stare decisis, impair
or dispose of other individual claims arising from the
pollution or environmental degradation by the defendant.
Neither can environmentol class actions seeking damages
be brought under Rule 23(b) (2), since this section is
inapplicable where the appropriate relief relates "exclusively or predominately to money damages.""
Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the questions of law or
fact common to members of the class predominate over
questions affecting only individual members.'s That
.. Id. at 101-102.
Zf Jd. at 102; see Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,
395 F.2d. 920, 987 (2d Cir. 1968); Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp.
550,555 (D. Md. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 364 F.2d 197 (4th
Cir. 1966); Wittkamper v. Harvey, 188 F. Supp. 715 (M.D. Ga.
1960).
25 Rule 23 (b) (3) also requires that a class action be superior to
other methods "for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con~
troversy .. . ," such as consolidation of actions or test cases by BOrne
members of the class. See N. 20 supra at 103. Rule 23 (b) (3) suggests
pertinent factors, which are not exhaustive, Id. at 104, to aid the
courts in finding whether the class action is "superior" to other proceedings. The factors listed in the rule are:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirabiJity of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forumi (D) the difficulties likely
to be eneountered in the management of a class action.
The interests of individual members of the class in prosecuting

•
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members of the class seek or allege differing amounts
of damages does not of itself preclude a class action
under Rule 23(b) (3) where there is a preponderance
of questions in common."
In determining predominance, the test is not the total
amount of time to be spent on proof of the common
issues, as compared to the time to be spent on proof
of individ\lal damages, but rather is the time which
would be spent in proof of the common issues in the
class action as compared to the time which would be
spent if no class action was allowed, and a large multitude of suits, each involving proof of the common issues,
were brought.17 Individual questions of damages, however, clearly predominate over common issues in largescale serions injuries. The Advisory Committee stated:
A 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous
persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class
action because of the likelihood that significant
separate lawsuits, however, ffmay be theoretic rather than practical:
the class may have a high degree of coheaion and prosecution of the
action through representatives would be quite unobjectionable, or the
amounts at stake for individuals may be so small that separate suits
would be impracticable." Advisory Committee's Note, supra. at 104.
The adverse effects upon the defendant that would result from the
maintenance of separate suits should be also eonsidered. Id.
%Ii Konisberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Advisory Committee's Note. aupra, 39 F.R.D. at
103 j see Eisen, N. 10 supra at 566; Dolgow, N. 7 aupra. at 490.
Though injuries and damages to the members of the class were
separately and distinctly caused, if they were the result of a common
course of conduct, there is a question common to the class which
predominates for purpose. of Rule 23(b) (3). Dolgow, N. 7 ."pra, at
490.
UPotential rivalry between class members after an initial finding
of liability can be adequately handled since the rule gives a
court the power to divide the class into appropriate subclasses
or to require the members to bring indivjdual suits for damages."

Eisen, N. 26 aupr4 at 566.
17 Minnesota v. U.S. Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 569 (D. Minn.
1968).

;
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questions, not only of damages but of liability ami
defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the
individuals in different ways. In these circumstances
an action conducted nominally as a class action would
degenerate in practice into multiple law suits separately tried"·
Environmental class actions seeking damages for
injury to health or welfare from pesticides, air pollution,
or radiation would clearly be analogous to the "mass
accident" example. Damages and liability would depend upon many issues affecting the individual members
of the class in different ways.
For example, Yamlacone v. Montrose Chemical Co'"
has placed at issue the effects of D.D.T. upon the wildlife resources of the entire United States, as well as
upon the biological systems of every American. Because
the action seeks damages, to be distributed to local,
state, and federal governments to be used to remedy
the damage done by D.D.T. to the natural resources
and environment of the United States, the application
of D.D.T. to every area of the United States and the
effect of D.D.T. upon the environment of each particular
area will be at issue.
Even if injunctive relief and not damages were requested, proof of the amount of D.D.T. applied in every
area of the United States would be required. Even the
effects of particular quantities of D.D.T. on particular
species would in reality not be a common issue, since
these effects would depend upon when the D.D.T. was
applied, the concentration of the application, and,
possibly, the effects of D.D.T. on each species in a
particular geographical area.
Even fewer common issues of law and fact are presented with respect to the class of those whose bodies
11 Advisory Committee's Note, supra, 39 F.R.D. at 103.
(S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 14, 1969).

2' No. 3761-69
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have been nllegedly damaged by D.D.T., a class that
could be composed of every resident of the United
States.'· The claims of each individual member of this
class will yal'y with respect to the !lmount of D.D.T.
applied in areas where he has resided and the date that
the D.D.T. was so applied- factors that bear on the
concentration and effects of D.D.T. on cach individual
citizen. Common issues of law and fact would clearly
not predominate in this class ; therefore these claims
can not be brought as a Rule 23(h) (3) class action. Supporting this conclusion is that notice, because the
presently defined classes potentially include all residents
of the United States, cannot possibly reach all members
of this class." Consequently, this action may forever
bar many millions of Americans, without their knowledge, from future claims against tllP manufacturers of
D.D.T. for bodily injury. The fact tlmt D.D.T. concentrations will vary even with in a narrow geographical
area, with vary ing conccntration of D.D.T. and varying
effects from D.D.T. on the residents of the area, indicates that even a reduced form of class action should
not be allowed to be maintained for individual damages.
Environmental lawyers mnst take great care that
their claims do not innoculate the courts against all
environmental class actions. There are many less grandiose but vali(l IIses of class actions as prophylaxis
against environmental or conSllmer damage. In many
cases the amount of individual damages is not important because it is "de minimis" and restoration is
impossible. In Bebchick v. Public Utilities COllunissionl1
and Dar,. v. Yellow Cab Co.," the class action was used
JO Though claims for individual damages are not explicitly pleaded
as reHef, N. 13 8upra, such claims might be regarded as in issue
under liberal rules of pleading.
31 See Philadelphia, N. 9 &upra. at 461-462 .
.. 318 F.2d 187 (C.A.D.C. 1963). cert. d.,.ied 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
J3 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732. 63 Cal. Reptr. 724 (1967).

,
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to rebate overcharges, not to the actual individuws
injured, but to the general class by lowering future
fares. In environmentw protection it is also necessary
to be able to use Rule 23 to benefit the class, qua class,
and to require a defendant to pay damages for his
action despite the impossibility of individual restitution. These rebate cases show the usefulness of both
Rule 23 and broad definitions of the class where the
cornmon question is the action or unjust gain of the
defendant, rather than the damage to the plaintiff.
Contemporary law, while stressing individual restitution, nlso recognizes a very important deterrent ami
corrective effect in damage actions.
In environmental class actions seeking damages for
injury from pesticides, air pollution, or radiation, where
the members of an amorphous, anonymous, and unquantifiable class are asserting separate and distinct
damage claims, as in the El Paso case, there can be no
cohesion between the members of the class. The El Paso
pleadings contain internal inconsistencies, since if the
henlth effects allegedly caused by the pollution are as
severe as pleaded, the individual claims are large
enough to justify maintenance of separate suits. In
addition, where the size of the class is in the hundreds
of thousands, or even millions, with the individunl
members of the class having separate and distinct claims,
as in the D.D.T. and El Paso cases, there will be extreme
difficulty in managing the class action. The logical has
been carried to the absurd.
DETERMINATION OF MAINTENANCE
OF CLASS ACTION

".As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action," the court must determine whether the action may be maintained as a class

•

•

•
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action'" The rule "calls upon the judges to judge,"!5 and
places upon the court the affirmative dllty to make this
determination even in the absence of a proper motion by
the plaintiff or defendant as to the propriety of the maintenance of the class action .... This determination must be
made even if the defendant offers no resistance to the
class action."
"The burden is on the plaintiffs to establish their right
to maintain a class action. . . . But this does not mean
... that plaintiffs must finally establish their entire case
before a preliminary determination of the class action
question can be made.'''· The court should exercise its
duties with particular care, and should be rigorous in
having the plaintiff satisfy this burden of proof, in environmental class actions such as the Et Paso and D.D.T.
enses, where the dangers of abuse are so great.
The court may allow the class action to proceed on a
conditional basis, such as by ordering that "a class action
may be maintained only if the representation is improved
through intervention of additional parties of a stated
type," and may alter or amend its determination "before
the decision on the merits if, upon fuller development of
the facts, the original detennination appears unsound. lIl•
34Rule 23(c) (1), See the section on Res Judicata: Compromise,
Settlement and Notice for the relationship between Rule 23(e) and

•

23(c) (1).
lS Frankel, "Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule
23," 43 F.RD. 39, 40 (1968).
315 Weisman, N. 18 supra. at 271, N. 1; Ziegler v. Gibralter Life
Ins. Co., 43 F.RD. 169, 170 N. 1 (D.S.D. 1967).
37 Ziegler, N. 36 .upra..
•• Philadelphia Elec., N. 9 '''I'ra at 457.
39 Ibid.; see Weisman, N. 18 BUpra at 265j Ziegler, N. 36 .upra,' cf
Richland v. Chetham, 272 F. Supp. 148, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where
the court disapproves of allowing a class action to )Jroceed condi.
tionally, finding it preferable to proceed "by consolidation and intervention without prejudice to subsequent dass action treatment if,
upon further development of the litigation, it appears appropriate,"
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Even if individual questions arise during the course
of litigation, which render the action 'unmanageable'
the court still has thc powcr at that time to dismiss
the class aetion and permit the plaintiff to proceed
only on behalf of himself.4•
.A:ny deficiencies in the pleading of a class action are
subject to correction by amendment.41

The fact that plaintiffs' definition of the class is not
acceptable does not require dismissal of the class
allegations ... . (C)ourts should employ the full
measure of the discretion granted by the Rule, whenever a fair reading of the complaint permits, to define classes .. ; in a manner which will permit utilization of the class action procedure."
In cases such as the D.D.T. and El Paso class actions, the
courts should require that the classes be more conservatively defined, rather than allowing the action to proceed
conditionally as a class action. The strong likelihood of a
multitude of individual issues arising, and the impossibility of providing actual notice to members of the class,
combined with the binding effect of thc judgment, suggest that redefinition of the class by amendment of the
pleadings is the proper solution in the D.D.T and El Paso
class actions.

•
•

•

STANDING TO MAINTAIN CLASS ACTIONS
A common issue in environmental litigation arises under Rule 23(a), which states that "[olne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all . . ." members of the class when
the other requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied. The question of who is a member of a class is an important issue
40 Eisen, N. 10 supra at 566.
Ziegler. N . 36 "'p"G at 176.
4Z Dolgow, N. 7 supra. at 492.

41
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in environmental class actions where nonprofit conservation corporations sue on behalf of a class of individuals
to enjoin threatened environmental degradation." Often,
only sllch corporations are able to muster the scientific
evidence, expert witnesses, and the expenses of litigation
and to provide the respectability in the eyes of the court
and the public necessary for the successful prosecution
of environmental litigation. The Supreme Court has
stated that the plaintiffs in a class action "cannot represent a class of whom they are not a part.' .... However,
the language of Rule 23(a) does not define who is a member or a "part" of a class.
Though the Supreme Court generally denies standing
to one seeking to assert the rights of another,'s this "is
only a rule of practice" which may be "outweighed by the
need to protect the fundamental rights which wonld
[otherwise] be denied ... .'... Thus, in N.A.A.C.P. v.
State of Alabama," the N.A.A.C.P. was held to have
standing to assert the First Amendment rights of association of its members that were allegedly violated by
Alabama statues which required the N.A.A.C.P. to give
its Jist of members to the Alabama Attorney General.
The "nexus" between the N.A.A.C.P. and its members
was held to be sufficient to permit the N.A.A.C.P. to
represent the rights of its members." Standing was also
upheld on the grounds that the constitutional rights of the
members of the N.A.A.C.P. to withhold their membership
4) See, e.g., Defenders of FJoriasant, Inc. v. Park Land Co., C·1539
(D. Colo. 1969); Colorado Open Space Coordinating Council, Inc. v.
Seaborg, C-1712 (D. Colo. 1969) •
.. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 81, 32-33 (1962) •
• 5 See, e.g. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) •
.. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953); see N.A.A.C.P.
v. Patty, 169 F . Supp. 603, 529 (E.D. Va. 1968), ,ov'd on olk.,
grounds sub nom. Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959) •
• ' 367 U.S. 449 (1958) •
•• Jd. at 468-459.
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in the organization from the knowledge of the State of
Alabama would be nullified if they personally sought to
enforce their rights in court. The court rela.""ed lhe rules
of standing since the constitutional rights of the members
of the N.A.A.C.P. "could not be effectively vindicated
except through an appropriate representative before the
Court.'''· Through N .A.A.C.P. v. Alabama deillt only with
the standing of organizations to assert its members constitutional rights of association with respect to the organization, the Supreme Court has upheld the stamling
of a trnde association to represent lhe interests of its
members with respect to Iln order of the Interstate Commerce Commission 50_a matter not related to its members' rights of association. In Norwalk Core v. Norwalk
Redcvelopmf.!1t Agency'>' the court stllte<l, thongh not
ruling on the matter, that
We think that the reasons for r9{1Iliring an imlivillllal
plainliff in a class action to be a memhHr of tllP class
do not necessarily preclude an association frolll rp]Iresenting a class where its raj"OIt d' dn, is to represent the interests of that class. . . . [Hjowever,
whether the association plaintiffs have standing ...
depends on whether there is compelling nped to grnnt
them standing in order that the constitutional rights
of persons not immediately before the court might lJe
vindicated. See N.A.A.C.P. I'. State of Alabama "X
reI. Patterson . .. (We rpject the ... contention
that an association cannot represent the rights of its
members unless the interests of the association itself
are involved. In N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama ex
reI. Patterson, the Supreme COllrt s}Jecifically referred to the likelihood that the association its!'lf
would IJe adversely affect!'d as a 'further factor'
49 N. 47 Bupra at 459; see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
428 (1953); Loui.iana ex. reI. Gremillion v. N.A.A.C.P., 366 U.S. 293
(1961); National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United S tates, 372
U.S. 246 (1963) .
so National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n, N. 49'· '"'FII.
5.395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).

•
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pointing toward thn holrling of standing. ... ) It appears to liS that the iml ivi<lnal plaintiffs can a<lequately n~llres(>nt the interests of all mpmhers of til!'
relevant class, but we will not prl!chul e the plaintiffs
from trying to show to the District Conrt's satisfaction that it is only the association plaintiffs which
can I)CrJorm this function. 52
In Smith 11. Board of Education,S' a teacher's association, suing on hehalf of a class of Negro teachers to enjoin discriminatory practices in the hi ring and assignment of t!·aclH.'l's, was held to have standing to represent
the class. The court heM that the teacher's association
should have standing as a n'al party in interest because
the dismissal of teachers might a<lvers(!ly affect it, dne
to a decrease in membership and financial support, and
because the individual members of the class might be deterred, because of f ear of reprisals, from hringing snit
themselves, or might lose interest in the litigation, if ami
when they obtained other jobs after discriminatory refusals to hire.54 Because the plaintiff teacher's association
was a real party in interest under Rule 17(a), the court
stated that it was also a "member" of the class it sought
to represent. 55
51Id. at 937-938.
53 365 F.2d 770 (8th Clr. 1966).
$4 Id. at 776-777.
55 Ibid.; see also N.A.A.C.P. and Harrison. N. 46 supr.. ; W.A.C.O.
v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Shelton v. McKinley,
174 F. Supp. 351, 355 (E.D. Ark. 1959). r.~ 'd on other grounds sub
nom. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Alabama State
Teaehers Ass'n v. Lowndes County Bd. of Educ., 289 F. Supp. 300,
302 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Buford v. Morganton City Bd. of Educ., 244
F. Supp. 437, 445 (W.D.N.C. 1965) . One case has held that an or-

ganization cannot represent the rights of the individual members of
the class. C.O.R.E. v. Comm'r" Social Security Administration, 270
F . Supp. 537 (D. Md. 1967). However, in that cue there were no
allegations that the defendants had acted illegally toward any of the
individual members of the clus. Therefore, no interest of the class
was alleged to have been violated, and there was no evidence indicating that it would be difficult for the members of the clus to

,
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1I'/lnealk Core and Smith 1). Board of Education Im\'('
tllll~ ('xhmded N.A.A.C.P. 1'. Ala/Jallla to allow organizations to have standing in class actions on behalf of the
interests of individual memhers where the purpose of the
organization includes representation of the interests of
that class, and where there is a compelling need to grant
them standing in order that the rights of the individual
membcrs of the class can be effectively vindicated. Among
the "compelling reasons" for allowing standing to organ izations in environmental class actions would he the fear
of "<'prisal for hringing the law suit, eventual lack of
interest in the litigation by an individual class member,5'
the fact that expenses of the snit would be so great "that
it could not be prosccuted withollt ontside l1i(I,"51 or the
likelihood that a vigorolls prosecution of the suit could
not he made without the expertise in litigation and the
expert scientific witnesses that the organization could
bring to the action. s8
vindicate their rights themselves. The denial of standing to a nonprofit corporation representing a majority of the incorporated municipalities in Nebraska and to 8n unincorporated labor association
in League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189
(D. Neb. 1962), a suit to declare a state legislative apportionment
statute unconstitutional, can be distinguished on the grounds that
their raison d'etre (see Norwalk Core. N. 24 Bupra.) did not include
the protection of individual voters, whose rights were infringed by
unconstitutional apportionment and who would have standing to
maintain the action. 209 F. Supp. 189, 191. "The denial of standing
to two welfare rights organizations in National Welfare Rights
Organization v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), i. distinguishable on the grounds that there was no showing of "lack of
effective representation, gross adverssrial inequality, or any practical
Dr theoretical obstacle to the individual plaintiffs' effective assertion
of their claims." IcL at 1348.
56 Smith, N. 63 supra. at 776-777.
51 N.A.A.C.P., N. 46 .upra at 509.
58 See Norwalk, N. 24 supra at 938: U[W]hether the association
plaintiffs have standing . . . depends on whether . . . it is only the
association plaintiffs which can . .. adequately represent the interests of all members of the relevant class. . . .n
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Courts have allowed standing to organizations to bring
class actions without requiring a showing that there was
a compelling need for granting standing to the organization or that only the organization could adequately prosecute the class action. In Crowther v. Seaborg,s, a suit to
enjoin the flaring of r adioactive natural gas by the A.E.C.
from an underground cavern into the atmosphere, a nonprofit public benefit conservation corporation, the Colorado Open Space Coordinating Council, was held to have
standing to bring "a class action on behalf of all persons
entitled to the protection of their health and the use and
enjoyment of the natural resources of Colorado." C.O.S.C.
was held to have standing "to assert the interests of its
incorporators and the public for whose benefit it was
formed.' ....
Crowther v. Seaborg would thus grant standing to conservation organizations to bring environmental class actions on behalf of individual members, where their corporate purpose included the protection of the interests
of the members of the class, without regard to whether
there was a "compelling need" to grant such standing.
This would be the better rule, and one consistent with the
latest statement of standing by the Supreme Court.
The requirements of standing, as recently stated by
the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations v. Camp" and Barlow v. Collins,"Z
59 CrowtherIN. 4 Bupra.
60 Ibid. Two incorporated associations representing nudists were
heJd to have standing to challenge a statute, prohibiting the practice
of nudism, as representatives of their members. Roberts v. Clement,
252 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) . The court, citing N.A.A.C.P. v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and N.A.A.C.P. and Harrison, N. 46
supra, stated that "when civil rights are involved, these rights may
be asserted by corporations in behalf of their members." 252 F. Supp.
836; ct. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093
(C.A.D.C. 1970).
" 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
02397 U.S. 159 (1970).

,
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are, first, that the plaintiff satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution hy
having the "personal stake and interest that impart the
concrete adverseness required hy Article II!.'''' To satisfy this requirement, the plaintiffs must allege "that the
challenged action has caused ... injury in fact, economic or otherwise."" In a suit to enjoin the Secretary
of Transportation from approving, granting, or using
Federal funds for a state secondary road project that
allegedly would destroy the recreational and ecological
values of a stream, this requirement was held satisfied hy
an incorporated non-profit conservation organization
whose purposes included protection of the area hy individual citizens who used and enjoyed the area in question,
and by an unincorporated association whose members
used and enjoyed the area in question,os Though the opinion did not state whether the suit was a class action, this
case would allow standing to conservation organizations
whose purposes included protecting areas threatened by
environmental degradation, such as that in controversy,
or protecting the interests of the members of the class
they allegedly represent.
The second requirement of standing is "whether the
interest sought to be protected . . . is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected by the statute or constitutioual guarantee in question.''" Groups or individuals concerned with the protection of historic, natural and
scenic resources have been held to be within the zone of
interests of statutes concerned with the protection of
these factors in suits to restrain environmental degradation by federal agencies who allegedly are exceeding their

,

•
Barlow, N. 62 supra at 164.
o. N, 61 Bupr" at 162,
65 Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, Supp. - No. 70-123 (M,D. Pa. 1970) •
.. N, 61 Bupro at 153,
Ii)
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statutory authority or abusing their discretion." Conservation organizations bringing class actions asserting the
rights of individual members of the class which allegedly
were protected by the constitution or statutes would also
be within the "zone of interests," thus satisfying this second requirement.
Thus, under the latest statement of standing by the
Supreme Court, conservation organizations would have
standing to represent a class of individuals where their
purpose included the protection of the area of the environment allegedly threatened or the protection of the
interests of the class, without regard to whether there was
a "compelling need" to grant this standing.

ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
The quality of representation in a class action is crucial
in the determination of the fairness and adequacy of representation." In environmental litigation, the adequacy of
representation by the plaintiff has an important bearing
on the action. The ability of the representative party to
present the scientific evidence requisite for success on the
merits is an important criterion in environmental litigation. Presentation of proper claims and the raising of the
relevant issues by the representative party are also important factors to success. There are numerous remedies
which may be sought in an environmental law suit. Only
a proper choice of the remedy requested will assure the
greatest probability of success, as measured by the environmental protection that would be afforded by the relief requested, and the probability of obtaining such relief
from the court. These numerous factors which determine
Itt N. 65 supt"(l.j Citizens Committee for the Hudson VaHey v. Volpe,
302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D. N.Y. 1969), aff'd 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970) •
.. Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 206 (D.D.C. 1969).
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the success of environmental litigation are directly dependent on the adequacy of representation.
A plaintiff has the burden of showing that he will adequately and fairly protect the interests of the class." The
adequacy and fairness of representation is determined by
Rules 23(a) (3) and 23(a) (4). Rule 23(a) (3) requires that
the claims of the representative party be typical of the
claims of the members of the class. Rule 23(a)( 4) requires that the representative party "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." These are the
only two requirements to be used in determining adequacy of representation.'"
The requirement that the claim of the representative
be typical of those of the entire class is the same as stating that the interests of the representative party must
coincide with,n and "be compatible with and not antagonistic to those whom he would represent."'" If there is a
conflict, it must be a substantial conflict between members
of the class over the very issue in litigation to justify
dismissal of a class claim for failure of adequacy of representation." Though disparity in damages sought by
members of the class may effect the issue of "predominWlce" under Rule 23(b) (3), such disparity does not make
"Weisman, N. 18 .upm at 206.
70 Shulman, N. 68, .upra.; Meraay v. Firat Republic Corp., 43 F.RD.
465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11 Meraay. N. 70 .uprtt.
7Z Shulman, N. 68 ,upra at 207; ct. Eisen, N. 10 ,upTa at 562-663.
n Mersay, N. 70 .upro at 468. A conflict of interest should not be
found between the representative party and the members of the class
merely because every individual member of the class ia not enthusiastic about the maintenance of the litigation. Eisen, N. 10 supra at
563 N. 7; Shulman, N. 68 .upra. Thus, the fact that ninetyeight members of a class filed affidavits either indicating that they
did not want to be represented by the plaintill' or withdrawing from
the suit did not warrant dismissal of the class action where the entire
class numbered approximately 1,200. Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy
Coop. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968).
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the claims of the representative atypicaP4 In asserting
his own interests, the representative party must be able
to assert the interests of all of the members of the class. n
If the claims of the members of the cla8s are too varied,
a few members of the class acting as representative
parties may not have claims typical of the class so as to
be adequate representatives of the class. Where the environmental class action involves separate and distinct
claims by each member of the class in order to establish
liability, such as in pesticide, air pollution, or radiation
cases, the claims may be so disparate and the individual
questions and issues so extensive, that no individual can
have a typical claim nor fairly and adequately represent
the multitude of claims." In some such circumstances, the
court may be able to require a larger number of representative parties whose interests, taken together, are
typical of the varied interests of the members of the
class. 77 In other actions the mere size of the class will
make adequate representation impossible.
Adequacy of representation depends on other criteria.
Objectively judged, all members of the class, including
those who would prefer the status quo, should have their
status "helped." At a minimum antagonistic interest
should be eliminated "so far as possible.''''· The requiremeut that the representative party fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class is satifled where "the
representative party ... [is] iuterested enough to be a
forceful advocate and his chosen attorney. . . [is] quali:fled, experienced, and generally able to conduct the litiga74 Minnesota v. U.S. Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 659, 667 (D. Minn.
1968).
7S Menay, N. 70 aupra at 470.

" See section on Definition ot the Class, discuuinc the D.D.T.
and El Pa.o eases.
n See Note, uClass Actions Under Amended Rule 23: Three Years
of Judicial Interpretation," 49 B.U.L. Rev. 68Z, 690 (1969).
71 Eisen, N. 10 supra.
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tion.
'rr. The burden of showing that he will adequately and fairly represent the class does not require
the plaintiff to present his attorney's qualifications, for
the court may want to reserve judgment pending a later
assessment "after a proper appraisal of all the factors
enumerated on the face of the rule itself."·· In class actions, the counsel of a representative party is assumed to
be a skilled practitioner, and able to properly conduct the
class action, unless the contrary is shown.· 1 The representative party and his counsel must make the "vigorous,
conseientious, and undivided effort required to 'fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.' ,..1 The representative party must be able to afford due process to
the interests of the members of the class," since the judgment in a class action is conclusive as to the rights of
absent class members.·' The size of the individual interest
which the representative party is asserting is immaterial
where his representation will be fair and adequate.· s
Adequate representation refers to the quality of representation, not the quantity of representation.·' The fact
that other members of the class have not sought to intervene is not determinative of whether the plaintiff is a
proper representative of the class. 81 "Even one member of
a large number of claimants can provide the kind of representation for all which might otherwise be unattainable
19 Shulman, N. 68 .upra; see Mersay, N. 70 ,upra.
so Eisen, N. 10 .upra. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.Zd
731 (2d Cir. 1965), c.rt. d."i<d 382 U.S. 816 (1969), suggests the
rule be given a liberal interpretation.
11 Dolgow, N. 7 ,upra at 496.
81 Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 714 (7th
Cir. 1968).
U Mersay, N. 70 supra. at 469.
• 4 Eisen, N. 10 .upra at 562.
IS See Richland. N. 39 supra at 163 .
.. William. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 234 F. Supp. 985, 987
(E.D. La. 1964); Eisen, N. 10 ...pro at 563.
87 Ibid.,' Hohmann, N. 82 .upra. at 714.

•
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it each claimant had to act individually."" A class action
should not be dismissed because members of the class not
before the court have not expressed approval of the adequacy of representation. Rather, the court should be more
concerned "with those affirmative expressions of disapproval than with the sileuce of those represented.""
Neither the number of representative parties in a class
action nor the percentage of members of the class that
are representative parties is determinative of adequacy
or inadequacy of representation. Thus, in Eisen,to the
court held that the fact that the representative party was
allegedly representing a class of 3,750,000 and had only a
small claim was not relevant to the adequacy of representation. In Dolgow," the numerical disparity in a class
action brought by four members of the class on behalf
of 200,000 members of the class was held not to preclude
maintenance of the class action.91
In environmental class actions sllch as the El Paso and
D.D.T. cases, however, no matter how vigorous a prosecutor and how competent the plaintiff and his counsel, it is
impossible to have fair and adequate representation. The
claims of the members of the class are all separate and
distinct, and establishment of liability requires proof of
these millions of individual claims, which no representative party can do. In such cases, because of the spectre
of the binding effect of the judgment, the impossibility
that even a small percentage of the class will receive
actual notice, and the many separate and distinct claims
at issue, no party can provide the quality representation
required to satisfy due process. In the El Paso and D.D.T.
actions, silence of the class may well be misleading be"Ibid .
• , Weisman, N. 18 .uprt& at 262.
90 N. 10
91 N. 7 .upra.
.2 See also Siegel v. Chicken nelight. Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722. 727728 (N.n. Cal. 1967); Koni.herg, N. 26 lUJ>1'IL

"'pm.
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cause of lack of actual notice and because most members
of the class may not realize that they are members of the
class.
Another problem of adequacy of representation occurs
if the action has become moot as to the plaintiff. Such a
situation might arise in class actions seekiug damages
for continuing air or water pollution that infringes upon
rights of private property, where the plaintiff moves outside the area affected by the pollution.
Where a plaintiff was a proper representative of a
class at the time the action was filed, the action is not
moot because the action has become moot as to the plaintiff." Such a result "would be contrary to the expressed
purpose of Rule 23(e), which prohibits dismissal or
compromise of a class action if the result would be to
injure the other members of a purported class."" The
court in Gaddis v. Wyalnu95 allowed intervention by
members of the class who represented the interests of
the class, permitting the action to continue, where the action had become moot as to the plaintiff. Though no class
determination had been made under Rille 23(c) (I) at the
time the motion for intervention was made, "a class action
must be presumed to have existed at the time of the filing
of the motion for intervention.""
The parties must prepare themselves for inquiry by
the court on adequacy of representation. The defendant
may want to use discovery to ascertain adequacy of representation. In environmental actions, the adequacy of
representation must depend heavily upon the ability of
the representative party and his counsel to present the
.. Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
··Ibid.
.5 Ibid.
961bid.j compare Watkins v. Chicago Housing Authority, 406 F.2d
1234 (7th eire 1969), holding that plaintiffs in a class action for
whom the case was properly dismissed 8S moot could not continue to
represent members of a class allegedly in a similar situation.

•
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requisite scientific evidence through expert witnesses.
Thus, the prior experience of the plaintiff and his counsel
in presenting scientific evidence through scientific witnesses in environmental litigation would be a factor relevant to adequacy of representation. The contacts which
the plaintiff has with the scientific community, which
would be indicative of the plaintiff's access to expert
witnesses, and his ability to select the proper and best
expert witness required to vigorously prosecute the action, would also he relevant factors. 'l'he familiarity of
the plaintiff's counsel with the area of science at issue in
the litigation may be an important factor in determining
adequacy of representation, since this is indicative of the
counsel's ability to properly examine and cross-examine
the expert witnesses during the trial. A factor in determining whether the plaintiff's claim was typical of those
of other members of the class would be the involvement
of the plaintiff in administrative proceedings or activities
with respect to the controversy in the litigation." Where
the representative party in a class action is a public benefit, non-profit corporation, the court might inquire into
its purposes and into its prior involvement in environmental litigation to determine its ability to fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the individual members of the class.

AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS TO SATISFY
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT"
In order for the federal courts to have jurisdiction of
actions under federal question jurisdiction" or under
97 Ct . South Hill Neighborhood Asa'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454, 461
(6th Cir. 1969).
'" See 3 A.L.R. Fed. 373; Note, 49 B.U.L. Rev• • up,.,. at 712 •
•• 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

,
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diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,'" the value of the
matter in controversy mnst exceed $10,000.
Subsequent to the passage of amended Rule 23 in 1966,
a number of courts held that amended Rule 23 had
changed the rules with respect to class actions, permitting
aggregation in "spurious"'·' class actions as well as in
"true"'·' class actions.'o, However, other courts held that
Rule 23, as amended in 1966, had not changed the principle that separate and distinct claims could not he ag-

•

'DO 28

U.S.C. § 1382.
lot In "SPUriOU8" c1au action. under old Rule 23, which were "in
essence merely a form of permissive joinder in which parties with
separate and distinct claims were allowed to litigate those claims in
a single 8uit simply because the different claim. involved common
questions of law or fact," the claims of the members of the class
could not be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdictional amount require·
ment. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969), rehea.ring denied
394 U.S. 1026 (1969). Each plaintiff in a "spurious" due action had
to demonstrate that his individual claim was in excess of the juris.
dictional amount of $10,000. In a uspuriousJl class action. the right
asserted by the plaintiff is peculiar to him. Booth v. General Dy·
namic. Corp.• 264 F. Supp. 465. 470 (N.D. III. 1967).
102 In claRs actions under Rule 23, prior to its amendment in 1966,
the claims of the different members of the class in "true" class ae·
tions. in which Nthe rights of the different class members were com·
mon and undivided," could be a"regated in order to satisfy the
jurisdictional amount requirement. Snyder, N. 101 supra at 336.
The true class action is one wherein the joinder of all interested per·
80ns would be required. M(Jor~'. Fedeml PrGctiu V 23.08. The claims
in a true class are aggregated because "the right of each individual
claimant depends on establishing the common or collective rights of
the clus." Moore'. F.deral Practice • 23.13. A true class action
is one based upon a public right, not upon a right peculiar to
the plaintiff'; the aggregated amount of the public's claim is the
value of the amount in controversy for purposes of satisfying the
juriadictional amount. Moore, .up,"" , 23.13 at 23-2959-60. In a
"true" class action, the "right asserted and the relief sought were
for the welfare of the entire body politic rather than for the indi·
vidual plaintiffs." Booth, N. 101 AprB at 470.
'0' Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn. 389. F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1968) ...... ·ct
sub nom.; Snyder, N. 101 supra,' Booth, N. 101 supra at 465i
Snyder v. Epstein. 290 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Collins v.
Bolton. 287 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ill. 1968).

}
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gregated in class actions to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount requirement. 104
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Snyder v.
Harris/os resolved this conflict by holding that Rule 23,
as amended in 1966, had not changed the rule that the
claims of the members of the class could be aggregated in
"true" class actions to satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirement, but could not be aggregated in "spurious"
class actions.
Ya1Mtacone v. Montrose Chemical CO.,10G with claims
on behalf of municipal, state and federal governments,
seeking reparations to rehabilitate the environment injured byD.D.T. and on behalf of those who have suffered
involuntary accumulation of D.D.T. in their bodies, would
be a "spurious" class action, since the claims would be
separate and distinct. The right to recover reparations or
individual damages would depend upon proof of individual damage, not upon the establishment of a common,
public right.
The El Paso l07 air pollution case, with claims based
on injury to the health and welfare of the members of
the class, is a "spurious" class action, involving separate
and distinct claims of individual injury. Environmental
class actions seeking damages that are on behalf of those
whose health or safety have been injured, as in air pollution or pesticide cases, will be "spurious" class actions
asserting separate and distinct claims. The claims of the
104 Alverez v. P an Am. Lif e Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. de"ied 389 U.S. 827 (1967); Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204
(8th Cir. 1968 ), aff'd 394 U.S. 332 (1969) ; Pomierski v. W. R. Grace
Co., 282 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Lesch v. Chicago & E . Ill.
R.R., 279 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Neville v. Delta Ins. Co., 45
F.R.D. 345 (D. Minn. 1968); Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 276
F. Supp. 96, 99 (D. Minn. 1967).
IDS Snyder, N. 101 supra.
lOIS Yaconne, N. 13 supra.
101 Fischer, N. 14 8upra.

.'
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members of the class will not be allowed to be aggregated
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount, so that the plaintiff
in such environmental class actions will have to have a
claim in excess of the jurisdictional amount. This inability to aggregate claims under amended Rule 23 may prove .
one of the most serious obstacles to environmental class
actions for damages, since representative parties in such
actions will be either limited or non-existent.

RES JUDICATA: COMPROMISE, SETILEMENT,
AND NOnCE
The Advisory Committee, in adopting new Rule 23 in
1966, expressed dissatisfaction with the old "spurious"

class action, which allowed members of snch classes to
have "one-way" intervention-"being allowed to intervene after a decision on the merits favorable to their
interests, in order to secure the benefits of the decision
for themselves, although they would presumably be unaffected by an unfavorable decision."'·1 Under old Rule
23, members of the class in a "spurious" class action (a
form of permissive joinder where parties with separate
and distinct claims litigated those claims in a single suit
because there were more common questions of law and
fact than individual questions),'·' were bound by the
judgment only if they intervened and became parties to
the proceeding. 11. In true class actions, in which members of the class are asserting common and undivided
rights,'" the judgment was binding on aU members of
the class, whether they intervened in the action or not. III
N. 20 ."PTa. at 105.
109 Snyder, N. 101 .upro. at 336.
110 MOOT.', Fetkral Proetiu. ~23.11 [6] at 23-2893.
111 N. 109 BUpra.. See the discussion of true class actions in the
section on "Aggregation of Claims for Jurisdictional Amount," text
accompanying notes 102-103, supra..
liZ N. 110 'upTa.
108
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As uiscusscd in the section on Aggregation of Claims
to Satisfy Jurisdictional Amounts, most environmental
class actions seekin damages for injury to man or his
environment from air pollution, pesticides, or rauiation
woulu be classified as "spurious" class actions under old
Rule 23. Under old Rule 23, judgments in such class actions woulu have bonnd only the members of the "spurious" class action who sought to intervene in the action.
Thus, if an environmental class action, classified as
"spurious," resulted in an adverse judgment to the plaintiff, either because improperly brought or because it was
a collusive or strike suit, only the rights of the plaintiffs
and intervening class members would have been prejudiced.
However, under new RnIe 23, as amended in 1966,
members of a class in an action maintained under Rule
23(b)(l) or Rule 23(b)(2) cannot exclude themselves
from the judgment: In a judgment in these class actions
binus all members of the class, whether they appear in the
action or not. "' In a class action maintained under Rule
23(b)(3), the "best notice practicable under the circumstances" must advise the members of the class that the
court will exclude them from the class if they so request,
and that if the member does not request exclusion, the
judgment, whether favorable or not, will be binding upon
him."s
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe
those to whom the notice provided in subdivision
(c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested
IURule 23(e) (3 ).
28 (e) (3); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d
Cir. 1968); Wren v. Smitb, 410 F.2d 390 (5th C;r. 1969); Siegel,
N. 92 supra at 727.
115 Rule 23 (e) (2); Green, N. 114 supra at 298.
114 Rule
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exclusion. and whom the court finds to be members of
the claHs.'"
Environmental class actions seeking damages, which
would have been classified as "spurious" class actions
under old Rule 23, could be classified as Rule 23(b) (3)
class actions under RuJe 23, as amended in 1966.117
The new Rule 23 consequently, has considerably
changed the binding effect of judgments in environmental
class actions seeking damages that would be classified as
"spurious" class actions under old Rule 23. Under old
RuJe 23, only members of the class who intervened in
such "spurious" class actions would be bound by the judgment, whereas under new Rnle 23, all members of the
class would be bound by the judgment in such suits, unless they excluded themselves from the action under Rule
23(b)(3). This is a significant difference, since under
old RuJe 23 members of "spurious" class actions wonld
be bound by a judgment only if they affirmatively intervened. Under new RuJe 23, members of Rule 23(b) (3)
class actions are bound by the judgment unless they
affirmatively act to exclude tllemselves, III though not all
members of the class have actual notice of the class
action.
By attempting to balance the burden of litigation and
by requiring other class members to be bound after "the
best notice practicable untler the circumstances," the rule
has opened up a Pandora's box for the environmental
litigator. He must beware of both friend and foe.
The rights of members of the class may be bound by
judgments in poorly prosecuted actions which are
brought with little attendant publicity, and then settled,
compromised, or hrought to judgment without members
115 Rule 23(c) (3).

In See text accompanying Ns. 106-107, supra.
118 Cf. School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc., 267 F . Supp. 1001, 1005 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
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of the class receiving notice (either because the clas3 was
too broadly defined or the notice was inadequate for providing actual notice). A similar danger arises from collusive and "strike" suits. An environmental tortfeasor
might bar all future actions against itself for environmental degradation by arranging a collusive suit, with
little pUblicity and inadequate notice, that results in a
judgment that bars all future suits for injunctive relief
or damages. A plaintiff might file suit against an
environmental polluter, and settle or compromise the
suit for monetary compensation that is well below the
potential liability of the defendant for environmental
degradation or pollution. Such results are particularly
harmful where the result bars future claims for environmental degradation where future lmowledge establishes
that the claim is far greater than presently thought, or
makes it possible to establish the defendant's liability,
which could not be done with present knowledge.
One means of guarding against such abuse of the class
action procedure in environmental class actions would
be to require that a Rule 23 (c)( 1) hearing to define the
class and examine the adequacy of representation be held
before an action filed as a class action would be allowed
to be compromised or settled under Rule 23 (e). By doing
this, the court would allow an environmental class action
to be settled or compromised only by one who was an
adequate and fair representative of the class. With respect to the fairness of representation where a settlement or compromise is proposed, a court can carefully
scrutinize the motives of the representative and the fairness of the settlement to all members of the class. "' If
119 Berger v. Purculator Prods., Inc., 41 F.R-D. 642, 643 (S.D.
N.Y. 1966) ; Polakoff v. Delaware Steeplechase and Race Ass'n, 264
F. Supp. 915, 917 (D. Del. 1966); cf. Philadelphia, N. 9 supra at
326; and Berger, supra at 643, which hold that a Rule 23(0) (1)
hearing did not have to be held it the not ice required by Rule 23 (e)
,.,aa given.
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the court can determine that an action was collusive it
should dismiss it without entering judgment on the
merits, for failure to state a ease or controversy as required by Article III of the Constitution.110 Determination of whether an action was collusive could be based
upon the relationship of the plaintiff and his counsel to
the defendant. If an action was determined to be a
"strike" suit, the court should dismiss the action with
prejudice only to the plaintiff, and award costs to the
defendant. However, motivation is usually unascertainable. Courts have stated that there are other ways to
guard against abuse of the binding effect of judgments
in class actions. One court has urged the use of such
protective measures as ordering notice to be directed to
members of the class, asking them whether they consider
the representation to be fair and adequate, or requiring
that the pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations
which include absent persons in the defined class.1Z1 Another court has indicated that members of a class not
parties to the litigation may avoid the binding effect of
an adverse judgment by attacking the adequacy of the
representation, or by excluding themselves from membership in the defined class. III
The greatest danger from the binding effect of judgments in environmental class actions will result from
sucli suits as the D.D.T. case, which attempt to represent
the separate and distinct claims of all Americans.11) In
such a case, because of the millions of separate and distinct claims by individual members of the class, it is as
impossible to obtain fair and adequate representation
110 See u.s. v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943).
1%1 Siegel, N. 114 supra; see Green, N. 114 euprm at 298.
1%2 Eisen, N. 10 Bupra at 563. A member of a class in a Rule
23 (b) (3) class action must exclude himself from the clasa attion

"'within a short time of commencement of the Buit, and surely
never, after a decision on the merits." Minnesota, N. 74 8upra at 676.
U3 See the text accompanying Ns. 10-12 on "Definition of a Class."
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as it is to obtain a representative with claims typical of
the class. Leaving members of the public to future collateral attacks or to seek exclusion in such an action to
a void the binding effects of a judgment is onerous, particularly where future scientific knowledge may change
the scope of the defendant's liability. The courts should
prevent the binding effects of such presumptuous class
actions as the D.D.T. case by finding that the claims of
the representative are not typical of the class or that
because of the size of the class and the disparity of the
claims of the members, the representative cannot fairly
and adequately represent the class, no matter how skilled
his cOllnsel and how vigorous the prosecution. The members of the proposed class should not have the affirmative
duty to exclude themselves from nor to collaterally attack
an action which the plaintiff has no right to bring as a
class action.
In environmental class actions where the class is
properly defined and the representation proper, the binding effects of the judgment in a Rule 23(b) (3) class action
should be controlled by tbe requirement for notice. U4 This
requirement becomes more important and thns more
stringent as the right sued upon becomes more important
to absent members of the class, A small rebate to commuters is far less important to them than health effects
of various toxic insults to the environment. Rule 23(c)
(2), which refers to the "best notice practicable under
the circumstances," has the flexibility to increase the requirements of notice with the seriousness of the rights
involved, It is desirable that courts thus .correlate the
notice required to the relief sought.
Where the rights sought to be vindicated are more
important collectively than individually, courts have held
that the notice requirements may be satisfied by publica124 See Rule 28 «) (2),28«)(3), 23(d) (2), discussed '"'pro,

I
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tion'" or even by extensive publicity gh'en to an action in
the newspapers, ..6 However, if a large number of individual members of the class can be identifiNI \\'ith reasonable
effort, but "financial considerations prp\'ent the plaintiffs
from furnishing individual notice to these members, there
may pro\'p to he no alternative other than t1w ,Iismissal
of th" class snit."'27
From a plaintiff's view, thc cost of notice is one of the
major hurdles to overcome in environmental litigation.
There is not an environmental or conservation organiza.
tion that is not financially overextended. Despite the excpssive natnre of some of the claims allll the size of the
class alleged in some environmental actions, we must remember that one of the major values of Rule 23 is to
allow smaIl stakeholders to make their collective claims
without prohibitive costs. To require strict notice where
the class is a broad public interest class suing to vindicate
public or group rights can unjustly terminate litigation at
the notice stage. Notice should not be allowed to become a
defensive weapon but should be, ultimately, a solution
correlating fairness, practicability, possibility, and the
type of relief sought.
In broad litigation purporting to represent public
rights, some alternative is required which will be less
expensive and time-consuming than individual notice, but
more effective than publication. The idea that newspaper
pUblicity may satisfy the notice requirement would seem
to run the risk of encouraging outrageous prayers for the
purpose of advertising the plaintiff's counsel and solving
notice problems all in one effort.
I1S Booth, N. 101 supra. at 472. "[S]ome sort 01 ritualistic notice in small print on the back pages of a newspaper would in no
event suffice." Eisen, N. 10 supra. at 669.
12' Snyder v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 286 F.
Supp. 927, 931 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Johnson v. Robinson, 296 F. Supp.
ll65 (N.D. III. 1967).
1%7 Eisen, N. 125 8upra.
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An alternative form of notice in environmental class
actions would be sending individual notice to representative organizations and individuals eoncerned with the
protection and quality of the environment. It could be
assumed thllt they have the experience, funds, and contacts to benefit from the notice. Individual notice would be
sent to organizations often involved in environmental
litigation, such as the Sierra Club and the Environmental
Defense Fund, which might wish to intervene in the action
to improve the qUlllity of representation or to raise additional claims or issues. Individual notice would be sent to
organizlltions involved in educational programs and political activities to protect the environment, such as the
National Audubon Society, the Wilderness Society,
Friends of the Earth, and Defenders of Wildlife, who
might be requested to inform their members, many of
whom might be members of the class, of the action and
of their rights to intervene or raise objections as to the
representation. Individual ci tizens who are active in the
protection of the environment who might wish to appear
in the action, or might inform memhers of the class of
their right to appear, would similarly be notified. Notice
should also be sent to industries and governmental
agencies with possible interest in the litigation. Affording notice to organizations and individuals which represented all possible interests held by the individual members of the class would best protect the rights of due
process of the individual members of the class where individual notice would be impracticable. Such notice to
responsible and representative organizations and individuals eould be expected to mitigate due process questions, afford the best possible protection of the interests
of the members of the class, and insure vigorous and responsible prosecution of the action.
The notice requirement l S clearly for the benefi t of both
parties to an action, and for the protection of those ab-
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sent, but who may be bound by litigation. Rule 23 does
not by its language put the burden of notice on the
plaintiff."" It may he that the defpnclant has the resources, and access to the class, which would dictate placing the duty on him.129 In environmental litigation such
as air pollution litigation against a local public service
electric utility, where the defendant would regularly bill
most members of the class each month, the reasoning of
Dolgow v. Anderson"· would seem to apply and dictate
that hurden of notice be placed on the defendant.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In pnvironmental actions, prohlems with the statute
of limitations will arise where the adverse effl'cts of a
non-continuing instance of environmental degradation or
pollution does not become known until a future date, as in
tbe case of radioactive contamination. The statute of
limitations may also present a problem in the case of continuing environmental pollution or degradation, such as
with air pollution or pesticides with long half-lives
(whose effects continue for a number of years suhsequent
to application). In such cases, the limitation period may
har claims based upon the effects of environmental pollution prior to the limitation period. In both instances, the
limitation period may run before the filing of claims by
members of the class. Another problem that the members
of the class face is the effect of a determination under
Rul .. 23(c)(1), made after the limitation period, that an
action may not he maintained as a class action.
The Advisory Committee has stated that though an
action has been determined to be a non-class action under
Rule 23(c) (1):
128 "Subdivision (e) (2) does not state that the plaintiffs shall
provide notice." Dolgow, N. 7 supra at 498.
129 Compare Dolgow, N. 7 supra, with Minnesota, N. 74 supra,
130 Do)gow, N. 129 supra.
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[T]he court may still be receptive to interventions
before the decision on the merits so that the litigation
may cover as many interests as can be conveniently
hamlled; the questions whether the intervenors in the
non-class action shall be permitted to claim 'ancillary'
jurisdiction or the benefit of the date of the commencement of the action for purposes of the statute
of limitations are to be decided by reference to the
laws governing jurisdiction and limitations as they
apply in particular contexts.!"
Where an action has been held to be properly maintained
as a Rule 23(b) (3) class action, the filing of the class action tolls the statute of limitations for absent members
of the class. Those members of the class who remained
in the class may date themselves back for the purposes
of the statute of limitations to the date of the filing of
the class action.131 These holdings apply to members of
the class of Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions,
who may not exclude themselves from the class action.
By permitting intervention in class actions by members
of the class for whom the limitations period has run at
the date of intervention, a court "does not necessarily
enlarge the period of limitations since the class action
relates back to the date of the complaint."'"
However, where the determination under Rule 23(c) (1)
is that an action may not be maintained as a class action,
problems of the statute of limitations arise as to the individual members of the class for whom the limitations
period has run at the date of this determination. One
court, though not resolving this problem, has indicated
III

Note, N. 20 ..."'" at 104.

1>' Minnesota, N. 74 ."p"" at 565; Philadelphia, N. 9 ...pro at (60.
U) Green, N. 114 I1lpra at 301, footnote 14. However, if the limita-

tion period baa run at the time of the filing of the class action, the
proposed intervenor would, of course, be barred from intervention,
or recovery &. a member of the clasl. See, e.g., Slack v. Stiner, 358
F.2d 65, 70 (5th eire 1966); Escott v. Barchis Canstr. Corp., 340,
F.2d 731, 732-83 (2d Cir. 1965).
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that this negative determination should bar individual actions by members of the class for whom the limitations
period hilS run. This is done hy having the negative determination relate hack to the filing of the complaint,
where "the reason for the negative determination is failure to meet the prerequisites of 23(a) or even if the reason is that the common questions do not predominate over
individual questions under 23(b)(3) . . . . "134 However,
this court indicated that if the negative determination
was hased upon "a weighing of various considerations of
judicial housekeeping, it should not relate back to the filing of the complaint, particularly if the member of the
class could show reliance upon the pendency of the purported class action, sufficient to toll the statute of limitations."'" To hold otherwise in this latter situation would
require every member of the class, out of caution, to file
a separate, individual action within the limitation period.
If a class was very large in size, relating back a "housekeeping" decision would either exclude most of the memhers of the class from recovery or would result in a large
numbcr of the members of the class filing individual actions or seeking to intervene, which would be inconsistent
with thc purposes of Rule 23.130 "Considerations of judicial housekeeping" is a "painfully vague" standard for
determining which negative determinations under Rule
23 (c)( 1) should relate back to the filing of the complaint
for purposes of the statute of limitations. U7 A better
stant lard would be to have a showing of "reliance" by a
memher of the class on the filing of the class action, as
a reason for not filing an individual action within the
peri 011 of limitations, be grounds for not relating the
negative determination hack to the filing of the claim.
114

Philadelphia, N.

us Ibid.

9 aupra

at 461.

,.6 Tbid.

137 Note, N. 18 -"pro. at 702.
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A standard that would not relate the negative determination back to the filing of the claim, where the individual could show lack of notice of the class action, would
he morc inconsistent with Rule 23, since all members of
the class are not rellllirCfI to have actual notice under
Rule 23.

APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
OF DAMAGES

•

•

Probably the first question in considering apportionment of damages is whether the nature of the claims requires individual restitution. The various transportation
overcharge cases mentioned previously'" show that in
many cases individual class members could not care less
about small refunds; yet, it is important to the deterrent
theory of law that the wrongdoer not receive a windfall
merely becanse "e.,act justice" cannot be done. Consequently, in these instances damages should be measured
by the defendant's unjust gain, rather than by the individual damages of the members of the class. A common
solution to the rate overcharge situation is to reduce future fares on the assumption that those overcharged will
continue to use the defendant's transportation. It would
be hoped that these logical approaches would be carried
over to the environmental field. Where individual approtionment of damages would be difficult in environmental
class actions, a court might require the defendant to install pollution control equipment in air and water pollution cases, or to rehabilitate the environment in pesticide
and radiation cases, rather than to award individual
damages.
If individual restitution is needed, there are several
ways that damages may be apportioned ami distributed
US See Ns. 32-33, supra.
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to members of a class. One method would be to have the
representative party estahliah the defendant's liahility
for damages to each memhpr of the class, and then havl'
the individual memhers of the class come forward, after
receiving notice, to ohtain their share of damages. Th£'
court might distrilmt.. til(> damages to tim indiv idual
members of the class, or might require that the plaintiff
or .Iefendant supervise the distrihution, as a truswe, to
t he indivi.lual mpmhers of ti,e cl ass ...•
Another method of distributing damages in pnvironmental class actions would be to have the individual
members of the class establish. their individual claims,
either before the court or an appointed master 14' after
th" representative party has established the general
liahility of the defendant.
However, it may often be necessary for individual
members of the class to establish both the defendant's
liability to them and their claim for damages, where the
defendant's general liability to the class cannot be
established. This latter situation is the more likely in
environmental class actions seeking damages, since the
claims of individual members of the class for injury
will usually be separate and distinct, requiring individual proof of liability and injury. In such cases, the
court sbould, by notice, direct the individual members
of the class to file claims for damages and provide
methods for them to prove their claims.
The court may provide that these individual claims
may be handled through a master.'" However, class
actions that require such procedures because separate
and distinct claims or the individual members of the
class raise individual issues of liability and injury may,
139 See Kalven & Rosenfield, "The Contemporary Function of a
Class Suit," 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 694 (1941).
".Id. at 693-695.
I •• Ibid.
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on closer examination, be found not to be properly
maintained class actions.
One solution to the problem would be, through notice,
to rcquire members of the class to file within a reasonable period of time "a brief statement of their intent
to prove damages; if they failed to do so, their claims
would be barred."'" This solution "would revcal the true
scope of the litigation, and would greatly reduce the
trouble and expense of any subsequent notices which
might be required, or provide a basis for informed reappraisal of the class action question under Rule
23(c) (1)."'" Thus, rather than barring the claims of
those memhers of the class who do not present claims
for individual damages, the court might reconsider
whether the class had been properly defined, since lack
of affirmative response might indicate that those individuals had not suffered damages and were not members
of the class.
However, if a court chooses to place snch an affirmative requirement on the members of the class, it should
make sure that those members of the class who are
barred for failure to file claims have probably received
notice of this requirement. The notice in this situation,
which occurs before the trial on the merits, should be
more likely to achieve actual notice than notice that
would be required subsequent to judgment of general
Iiahility, since the penalty for failure to file a proof of
claim at this time precludes a member of the class from
participating in the trial on its merits. This requirement
of an affirmative response by members of the class in
order to share in the judgment might not he required,
142 Philadelphia, N. 9 SUpTa. at 469. State of Iowa v. Union Asphalt
& Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403--404 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Harris

v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966).
I •• Philadelphia, N. 142 supra.

,
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however, where it would he tedious and would not "expedite or clarify the action."I ••

ATTORNEY FEES
In actions seeking damages for injury to health or
welfare or for environmental degradation or pollution,
many individual claims could not be litigated in separate
actions because the claims would be so small that no
attorney would prosecute the claim. I' s Because of this
fact, attorneys may attempt to join these small claims
in class actions. Substantial recovery by the class would
then provide a source of fees for the attorney.
Attorneys might thus bring suit on behalf of clients
with small individual claims as class actions, hoping to
prosecute the claims of all members of the class and
to receive fees on a contingent basis from all members
for whom recovery is made.
Problems of unethical solicitation may thus be presented. However, solicitation is a problem only until a
Rule 23 (e)( 1) hearing determines that an action may
or may not be maintained as a class action, since subsequent to that determination the court can control
solicitation by regulating the use of notice. I..
Rule 23 recoguizes that notice may be used for solicitation, rather than to protect the members of the class
or to insure the fair conduct of the action.I' 7 Courts
can control such solicitation by requiring the fonn of
notice to he approved by the court before it can be
144 See Berman v. Narraganset Racing Ass'n. 48 F.R.D. 333, 338
(D.R.I. 1969).
145 Eisen, N. 10 supra. at 666-667, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), DoJgow, N. 7 .up .... at 494-495.
146 Starr, uThe Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerationa
of Procedure," 49 B.U.L. Rev. 407, 409 (1969).
14' Note, N. 39 ntprm at 107.
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directed to the members of the c1ass.'o, It is proper to
inform members of the class in individual notices that
their interests in the class action will be represented
by the plaintiff's counsel unless they enter an appearance through counsel of their own choosing. lo, However,
courts have not allowed the names or addresses of
plaintiff's counsel to appear in published or individual
notice, using the office of the clerk of the court as a
return address.'s. Such a procedure, thongh adding some
administrative burdens to the courts, does control the
problem of solicitation.
The amount of attorncy's fees to be paid by non-party
members of the class for whom plaintiff's counsel has
collected damages may be determined and the payment
ordered by the court. 15I This would be the preferable
method of determination and payment of attorney's fees
in class actions, since it would avoid the solicitation
problems where the plaintiff's counsel personally
arranges attorney's fees on a contingent basis with each
member of the class, and would insure, through judicial
supervision, that the plaintiff's counsel was not the only
person to benefit from the class action.1Sl The court
could insure that the attorney's fees were fair, taking
into account the diminished paper work and increased
efficiency in handling individual claims in a class action,
while insuring that the non-party members of the class
did pay attorney's fees to plaintiff's counsel. The fees
in environmental class actions should be determined on
a quantum meruit basis by the court, not by individual
fee contracts. IS.
141 See Berman, N. 144 supra. at 339.

IO'ibid-

,so Ibid-

151 See N. 146 supra.
152 See, e.g., Eisen, N. 10 supra. at 567.
lSJ Kalven &. Rosenfield, N. 140 8upra at 717.
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CONCLUSION
There is an obvious, real, and immediate need to pull
back even further from our laissez-faire approach to
resource management. To an increasing number of us
it is more than esthetics, more than amenities, more
than a question 6f our standard of living. It is a question
of survival. The fact of a need however, does not suggest
that we should grasp every remedy no matter how
unappropriate.
Rule 23 offers a procedural device for certain group
relief and a deterrent against the commission of certain
group injuries. It can be useful in manageable situations,
i.e., to the stockholder, the employee, the taxpayer, the
ratepayer or the minority member suing for specific equitable relief against a certain defendant. Class actions
allow a plaintiff to lay on the scales not only his interests,
but also the interests of other dispersed, isolated, and
anonymous members of the same class. Use of the class
action is being threatened from a number of sources.
Plaintiffs' lawyers lise the class action as a public relations device to warn of apocalyptic disaster or as a selfpromotional gimmick. It is threatened by defendants' lawyers who use the "notice" requirement as a defensiye
weapon to force unnecessary and el>."pensive notice. Intrinsically, it is threatened by the very requirements of
amended Rule 23. Rule 23, in attempting to allocate the
burdens of litigation, has seriously restricted the use of
class actions by requiring the judgment to apply to all
absent members of the class. Serious restrictions on the
lise of environmental class actions for damages are imposed by the inability to aggregate the claims of the class
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount.
Our legal system is undergoing a rethinking of many
of its basic concepts. "Fault" is being questioned in our
divorce and tort law, and the concept of "mutuality" is
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llndprgoing the same re·examination. We are getting
away from the concept of mutuality in collateral
estopp<,1 and we should remove it from class actions.
Mutuality puts symmetry into the law of class actions,
and allows llS to say that if the plaintiff can take advantage of the judgment, so should he be bound by an
adverB" judgm<'nt. However, we pay a price in logic for
this symmetry. The equities are not balanced between
the parties. The defendant has been afforded his day
in court amI if he loses he at least had the opportunity
to fully present his case in his own behalf by his own
attorney. The absentee plaintiff, however has not had
his rlay in court. He has been "represented," often without his knowledge, by a stranger and a lawyer not of his
choosing.
The present amended Rule 23 substantially restricts
the use of class actions, for res judicata hanging over the
proceedings like the sword of Damocles and the economic
realities of notice require unnecessarily restricted classes.
Rule 23 often impairs the ability of absent members
of the class to assert their rights, and yet superficially
tempts the champertous lawyer and the strike sniter
to obtain a large fee through use of the class action.
The old class action rule had adequate protection
against litigation such as the D.D.T. and El Paso cases,
and also implemented the policy considerations which
originated class action litigation. The environmental
litigator would be served better by the "spurious" class
action of old Rule 23 than by amended Rule 23.

